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ACTUAL INNOCENCE IN NEW YORK:
THE CURIOUS CASE OF PEOPLE V. HAMILTON
Benjamin E. Rosenberg*
It is rare for a case from the New York Appellate Division to be as
significant as People v. Hamilton.1 The case, however, was the first New
York appellate court decision to hold that a defendant might vacate his
conviction if he could demonstrate that he was “actually innocent” of the
crime of which he was charged. Although the precedential force of the
decision is limited to the Second Department, trial courts throughout the
state are required to follow Hamilton unless or until the appellate court in
their own Department rules on the issue.2 Courts throughout the state are
thus entertaining numerous “actual innocence” motions inspired by
Hamilton.
While courts in some other states, including state appellate courts, have
recognized actual innocence claims,3 whether such claims should be
recognized, and if so under what circumstances, is a very live issue in the
federal courts and numerous state courts throughout the country.
Examination of Hamilton, therefore, provides a useful way to consider
issues that are of surpassing importance in criminal law and that will likely
reoccur in cases throughout the country. As Hamilton goes further than
many other courts have in considering the implications of actual innocence
claims, consideration of Hamilton may be of considerable value to courts
that consider actual innocence claims. Hamilton is a trailblazer, and its trail
will repay careful study.
I. BACKGROUND
Before considering Hamilton itself, it is appropriate to consider briefly
both New York’s collateral relief statute and the types of “actual
innocence” claims that might be asserted.
* General Counsel, District Attorney of New York. The views expressed in this Article are
the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the District Attorney’s Office.
1. 979 N.Y.S.2d 97 (App. Div. 2014).
2. See People v. Turner, 840 N.E.2d 123, 127 (N.Y. 2005); Mountain View Coach
Lines v. Storms, 476 N.Y.S.2d 918, 920 (App. Div. 1984) (“[T]he doctrine of stare decisis
requires trial courts in this department to follow precedents set by the Appellate Division of
another department until the Court of Appeals or this court pronounces a contrary rule.”
(citations omitted)).
3. See infra notes 54–72 and accompanying text (discussing authority relied on by
Hamilton).

1

2

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW RES GESTAE

[Vol. 83

A. New York’s Collateral Relief Statute, CPL Section 440.10
Section 440.10 of New York’s Criminal Procedural Law (CPL), like its
federal counterparts, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254 and 2255, sets forth certain grounds
on which a convicted defendant may collaterally attack her conviction.
Most of the grounds are well articulated and relatively narrow. Section
440.10(1)(a), for example, permits a collateral attack if it can be shown that
the court in which the defendant was convicted did not have jurisdiction.4
Other sections provide for collateral attack if the judgment of conviction
was obtained by duress or fraud,5 if the prosecutor presented material
evidence at the trial that he knew to be false,6 or if material evidence
presented at the trial was “procured in violation of the defendant’s”
constitutional rights.7
Of particular importance to an evaluation of Hamilton is section
440.10(1)(g), which provides that a convicted defendant may collaterally
attack her conviction on the ground that she has discovered powerful
evidence that if known to the jury would likely have affected the outcome,
and that could not have been discovered earlier even if the defendant had
exercised due diligence.8 Claims under this section are colloquially known
as “newly discovered evidence” claims.
Section 440.10(1)(h) is also especially important for Hamilton. That
section provides that a defendant may seek vacatur of her conviction if it is
established that the defendant’s judgment of conviction “was obtained in
violation of a right of the defendant under the [New York or federal
constitutions].”9 Until last year, that section had been used to challenge
convictions where a defendant’s right to, for example, adequate counsel,10
or the disclosure of exculpatory information,11 had allegedly been violated.
It thus complemented CPL section 440.10(1)(d), which, as noted above,
addressed constitutional defects that led to particular evidence being
adduced at a trial.12 Section 440.10(1)(h) addressed constitutional defects
that affected the trial but were not tied to particular pieces of evidence at the
trial. As seen below, Hamilton vastly expanded the scope of section
440.10(1)(h).
In addition to the grounds for relief, section 440.10 also sets forth certain
procedural requirements for collateral attack. Section 440.10(2) provides
that the court must deny a collateral attack if the issue raised had been
raised and rejected on the direct appeal of the conviction, if the appeal was
pending and might decide the issue, or if the defendant failed to raise the

4. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10(1)(a) (McKinney 2005).
5. See id. § 440.10(1)(b).
6. See id. § 440.10(1)(c).
7. See id. § 440.10(1)(d). The statute specifies other grounds for collateral attack, see
generally id. § 440.10(1)(e), (f), (g-1) & (i), but they are not relevant to this Article.
8. See id. § 440.10(1)(g).
9. See id. § 440.10(1)(h).
10. See, e.g., People v. Becoats, 984 N.Y.S.2d 720, 721 (App. Div. 2014).
11. See, e.g., People v. Williams, 854 N.Y.S.2d 586, 589 (App. Div. 2008).
12. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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issue on his direct appeal, although he might have done so.13 Section
440.10(3) provides that the court may deny collateral relief if the defendant
could have raised the issue—either prior to his sentence or in a previous
collateral attack—but failed to do so,14 or if he did raise the issue in a prior
state or federal collateral attack, but the earlier court denied the claim.15
Section 440.10(3) notes, however, that even if any of the circumstances
allowing for (but not requiring) dismissal of the collateral motion are
present, the court may still grant the collateral motion “in the interest of
justice and for good cause shown” in the exercise of its discretion, if the
motion is “otherwise meritorious.”16
B. Actual Innocence, Freestanding Claims, and “Gateway Claims”
The intuitive idea of “actual innocence” is clear enough. A defendant
who claims he is “actually innocent” is asserting, in simplest possible terms,
that he did not do what he was convicted of doing. It is not simply that the
evidence against him was insufficient for a jury to conclude beyond a
reasonable doubt that he committed the crime of conviction. Nor is it that
his rights were somehow violated by the government in the course of its
prosecution of him. The defendant who would assert a claim of actual
innocence is asserting, “I didn’t do it.”
It is worth pausing to note that however simple and straightforward such
an assertion appears to be, it is, in fact, more complicated. There is a
question about what the “it” is: Is the argument “I was not part of the
conspiracy of which I was convicted (although I may have been part of
another conspiracy)” a claim of actual innocence? Even though courts have
repeatedly said that claims of actual innocence are not claims of insufficient
evidence,17 it is not entirely clear what the difference is. We never know
what happened in any particular instance; we draw conclusions based on the
evidence that we have.18 At bottom, therefore, a claim of actual innocence
is a claim about evidence. If it is not that the evidence at trial was
insufficient to convict, it is that other evidence establishes—by some
standard—that the defendant is in fact innocent.
There are two categories of actual innocence claims, gateway claims and
freestanding claims.19 Gateway claims work as follows: a defendant
makes a showing that he is “actually innocent,” and, if he satisfies the
burden of making such a showing, is permitted to proceed to assert a claim
for collateral relief even if he would otherwise be procedurally barred from
13. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10(2)(a)–(c).
14. See id. § 440.10(3)(a), (c).
15. See id. § 440.10(3)(b).
16. See id. § 440.10(3).
17. See, e.g., Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998) (“‘[A]ctual innocence’
means factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency.” (citation omitted)).
18. Poventud v. City of New York, 750 F.3d 121, 143 (2d Cir. 2014) (en banc) (Lynch,
J., concurring).
19. See generally Andre Mathis, A Critical Analysis of Actual Innocence After House v.
Bell: Has the Riddle of Actual Innocence Finally Been Solved?, 37 U. MEM. L. REV. 813,
819–23 (2007).
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doing so. To obtain such relief, however, he must still establish that there
was some violation of his rights at trial that would, if there were no
procedural barriers, entitle him to such relief. Thus, it is not the defendant’s
actual innocence that entitles him to relief but the underlying violation. The
showing of actual innocence merely allows the defendant to advance his
case under circumstances where he would otherwise be procedurally
barred.20
Thus, a defendant might succeed in his gateway claim insofar as he is
able to convince a court to consider whether his underlying conviction was
marred by a constitutional defect, whereas, had he not made a gateway
claim of actual innocence, he might not have been able to get the court to
consider the argument. His petition might still be denied, however, because
even if he is “actually innocent” there may have been no defect in his
underlying conviction. Such a situation would obtain, for example, where a
defendant, advised by fully competent counsel, knowingly and intelligently
waives his right to trial and pleads guilty, and only later discovers that there
was an alibi witness unknown to him at the time of his plea who could not
have been discovered by him or anyone else at that time, even after diligent
effort. There having been no defect in the underlying proceeding, the
defendant’s petition would be denied, even though he is or may be “actually
innocent.”
Freestanding claims are simpler to understand than gateway claims. A
defendant who asserts a freestanding claim asserts simply: regardless of the
presence or absence of errors at my underlying trial, I have a claim of
innocence and should therefore be released from any criminal sanction or
process. That means that even if the underlying trial was perfect—
sufficient evidence, competent counsel, no violation of the defendant’s
rights—the defendant would be entitled to relief if he could show that he
was, in fact, actually innocent.
II. PEOPLE V. HAMILTON
The defendant was convicted in 1993 of a 1991 murder. The key witness
against the defendant was the victim’s girlfriend and, although the
defendant submitted a notice of alibi, naming two witnesses who claimed
he was in New Haven, Connecticut at the time of the crime, neither testified
at the defendant’s trial.21 One claimed to be too ill to testify, the other too
frightened.22 The defendant made a number of post-verdict and CPL
section 440 motions. In one of them, he represented that the key
prosecution witness had recanted her testimony, and he sought to introduce
the testimony of his two additional alibi witnesses, allegedly unavailable at
the time of his trial.23
20. See, e.g., McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1931 (2013) (“[A] credible
showing of actual innocence may allow a prisoner to pursue his constitutional claims . . . on
the merits notwithstanding the existence of a procedural bar to relief.”).
21. People v. Hamilton, 979 N.Y.S.2d 97, 100 (App. Div. 2014).
22. Id.
23. Id.

2014]

THE CURIOUS CASE OF PEOPLE V. HAMILTON

5

The hearing court denied the defendant’s motion and refused to hear the
testimony of the new alibi witnesses. Most significantly, the hearing court
held that “the affidavits of these witnesses, and their proposed testimony,
did not constitute newly discovered evidence [CPL section 440.10(1)(g)],
because the defendant had failed to establish that they could not have been
located in time to testify at trial with the exercise of due diligence.”24
Thirteen years later, the defendant moved again to vacate his conviction,
this time arguing that “evidence of his alibi established his actual
innocence.”25 He further argued that a “free-standing actual innocence
claim exists separate and apart from a claim of newly discovered
evidence,”26 and that the claim had to be considered even if the evidence
allegedly establishing actual innocence was not newly discovered.27 The
hearing court denied the defendant’s motion,28 and he appealed.
The Appellate Division reversed. The court first ruled that the
mandatory procedural bars of CPL section 440.10(2)(a) and (c)—which
provide, in substance, that a court hearing a collateral attack pursuant to
CPL section 440.10, must deny any claim that has been or could have been
raised on direct appeal—applied to claims of actual innocence generally,
but it did not apply to Hamilton’s case because Hamilton had not raised a
claim of actual innocence on direct review “and the facts underlying his
current claims did not appear in the record on direct appeal.”29
The court further noted that Hamilton had raised his claim of actual
innocence in prior CPL section 440.10 motions, and therefore the trial court
had the discretion, pursuant to CPL section 440.10(3)(b) and (c) to deny the
motion.30 Noting the discretionary nature of these bars, however, the court
summarily ruled that “there is no reason why the courts may not consider a
credible claim of actual innocence in the exercise of discretion.”31
Drawing the distinction between gateway claims and freestanding
claims,32 the court focused its attention on the latter.33 The court turned to
federal cases and concluded that while “[t]he [f]ederal courts have not
resolved whether a prisoner may be entitled to habeas corpus relief based
upon a freestanding claim of actual innocence,”34 the U.S. Supreme Court
“has recognized that ‘a credible showing of actual innocence may allow a
prisoner to pursue . . . constitutional claims . . . on the merits
notwithstanding the existence of a procedural bar to relief.’”35

24. Id. at 101.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 102 (quoting from the affirmation submitted by defendant’s counsel).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 103–04; see also supra note 13 and accompanying text.
30. Id. at 104; see also supra notes 14–15 and accompanying text.
31. Id. at 104.
32. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (discussing distinction between gateway
and freestanding claims).
33. Hamilton, 979 N.Y.S.2d at 104–05.
34. Id. at 104.
35. Id. at 105 (quoting McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1931 (2013)).
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The Hamilton court termed this the “fundamental miscarriage of justice
exception” to the procedural limitations on habeas relief.36 The court
noted, however, that the exception was limited to (1) “cases where the
petition is based on a retroactive change of constitutional law,” or to
(2) cases in which
“the factual predicate for the claim could not have been discovered
previously through the exercise of due diligence,” and “the facts
underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in the light of the evidence as
a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence
that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have
found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.”37

Continuing to survey federal law, the court observed that “‘actual
innocence’ means factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency of
evidence of guilt, and must be based upon reliable evidence which was not
presented at trial.”38 It further noted that “[t]he standard of proof generally
applied is proof of actual innocence by clear and convincing evidence,”39
and that “in ‘light of the new evidence, no juror, acting reasonably, would
have voted [the defendant] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’”40
After surveying briefly the laws of other states,41 the court finally
considered the law of New York, noting that no appellate court had
considered whether to recognize “a freestanding claim of actual innocence,”
although some trial courts had recognized the claim.42 The court then made
a series of rulings with broad significance.
First, the court held that “where the defendant asserts a claim of actual
innocence, new evidence may be considered whether or not” it satisfies the
requirements for “newly discovered evidence” (CPL section 440.10(g)) and
“other legal barriers, such as prior adverse court determinations, which
might otherwise bar further recourse to the courts.”43
Second, the conviction of one who was “actually innocent” violated the
due process clause of the state and federal constitutions because “a person
who has not committed any crime has a liberty interest in remaining free
from punishment.”44 The punishment of such a person, the court held, also
violates the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the New York
Constitution.45 Therefore, the court held, the claim was cognizable under
CPL section 440.10(1)(h), which allows for collateral relief from

36. Id.
37. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)).
38. Id. (citing Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623–24 (1998); Schlup, 513 U.S.
at 324).
39. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b)(2), 2254(e)(2)).
40. Id. (quoting McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct. at 1928).
41. The Hamilton court’s discussion of state and federal authority is further discussed
below. See infra notes 54–72 and accompanying text.
42. Hamilton, 979 N.Y.S.2d at 107–08.
43. Id. at 107 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 108.
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convictions “obtained in violation of a right of the defendant under the
[New York or federal constitutions].”46
Third, the defendant must establish his actual innocence by “clear and
convincing evidence.”47 The court explained that “[m]ere doubt as to the
defendant’s guilt, or a preponderance of conflicting evidence as to the
defendant’s guilt, is insufficient, since a convicted defendant no longer
enjoys a presumption of innocence, and in fact is presumed to be guilty.”48
Fourth, a defendant who makes a “prima facie showing” of actual
innocence is entitled to a hearing to allow him to make his showing by clear
and convincing evidence.49 The court defined a “prima facie showing,” as
“a sufficient showing of possible merit to warrant a further exploration.”50
The court held that the defendant had made such a showing because he had
credibly alleged an alibi and the main witness against him had recanted her
testimony and claimed that her testimony had been manipulated in the first
place.51
Fifth, at the hearing, “all reliable evidence, including evidence not
admissible at trial based upon a procedural bar . . . should be admitted.”52
Sixth, the remedy, if the defendant establishes his innocence by clear and
convincing evidence, is dismissal of the indictment. “There is no need to
empanel another jury to consider the defendant’s guilt where the trial court
has determined, after a hearing, that no juror, acting reasonably, would find
the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”53
The court remanded the case for a hearing on the defendant’s “actual
innocence.” As of the time of this writing, the hearing has not started.
III. QUESTIONS IN HAMILTON’S WAKE
To say that Hamilton leaves unresolved questions in its wake is not to
criticize it. Every important case, right or wrong, raises questions of
application and interpretation. A list of some such questions follows.
A. Does Hamilton Go Beyond Precedent?
Hamilton correctly notes that under federal law a claim of actual
innocence serves as a “gateway claim,” but it is not clear that actual
innocence is itself a ground on which collateral relief may be afforded under
federal law. That is, once a petitioner establishes “actual innocence” he
must still establish some other constitutional violation—often ineffective
46. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10(1)(h) (McKinney 2005).
47. Hamilton, 979 N.Y.S.2d at 108.
48. Id. (citing Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 314 n.42 (1995); Herrera v. Collins, 506
U.S. 390, 398 (1993)).
49. Id. at 108–09.
50. Id. at 108 (citing Goldblum v. Klem, 510 F.3d 204, 219 (3d Cir. 2007)).
51. Id. at 108–09.
52. Id. at 109 (citing People v. Cole, 765 N.Y.S.2d 477, 486 (Sup. Ct. 2003); Schlup,
513 U.S. at 328).
53. See id. (“[I]f the defendant prevails on his claim of actual innocence, a new trial
would not be necessary.”).
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assistance of counsel.54 Under federal law, a claim of actual innocence is
not a “freestanding claim,” such that once one establishes actual
innocence—to whatever standard of proof—one is entitled to collateral
relief. The court in Hamilton clearly goes beyond the federal cases.
Although Hamilton does not discuss it, there is, in fact, a very good
reason that a state court might recognize a freestanding claim of actual
innocence more readily than would a federal court, at least where such
claims arise out of state criminal prosecutions. In considering collateral
attacks on state criminal convictions, federal courts, unlike state courts,
must consider the limits imposed by federalism. As the U.S. Supreme
Court explained in Herrera v. Collins, “‘[f]ederal courts are not forums in
which to relitigate state trials.’”55 Thus, that Hamilton goes beyond federal
authority may be explained by the different stances and considerations of
federal and state courts in considering collateral relief for state criminal
convictions.
The court in Hamilton stated that “[a] number of states have recognized a
freestanding claim of actual innocence, some by statute with specific
limitations, and some by case law with less specific limitations.”56
Examination of the statutes that Hamilton cited shows, however, that the
“specific limitations” are quite significant. Several of the statutes limit
actual innocence to claims that are based on scientific evidence, some
specifically referring to DNA.57 Others limit such claims to those based on
newly discovered evidence.58 These are not strong support for Hamilton’s
recognition of a broad, freestanding, actual innocence claim that might be
based on evidence that is neither scientific nor newly discovered.59
Hamilton’s reliance on cases from other states is similarly open to
question:
• Hamilton cites the California Supreme Court case In re Bell in support
of the proposition that “[a] number of states have recognized a
freestanding claim of actual innocence . . . by case law,”60 yet Bell
expressly states that it is not relying on or recognizing a claim of actual
innocence.61

54. McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1931 (2013).
55. 506 U.S. 390, 401 (1993) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983)).
56. Hamilton, 979 N.Y.S.2d at 106 (footnotes omitted).
57. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-112-201 (2006) (requiring “scientific evidence”);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4504 (2007) (requiring DNA evidence); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 15,
§ 2138(10) (Supp. 2013) (requiring DNA evidence); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.21
(LexisNexis 2010) (requiring DNA evidence); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-30-117(a)(2) (2012)
(requiring “new scientific evidence”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-9-301 (LexisNexis 2012)
(requiring DNA evidence).
58. See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-301 (LexisNexis Supp. 2013) (requires newly
discovered evidence); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-327.11 (Supp. 2013) (requires “previously
unknown or unavailable evidence”).
59. But see ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 32.1(h) (2011) (codifying a broad freestanding actual
innocence claim).
60. Hamilton, 979 N.Y.S.2d at 106.
61. In re Bell, 170 P.3d 153, 157 n.2 (Cal. 2007) (“Although we have not yet recognized
on habeas corpus a claim of actual innocence untethered to any newly discovered evidence,
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• Hamilton also relies on authority from Connecticut for this
proposition,62 even though, as Hamilton acknowledges, the most recent
authority from Connecticut indicates that it is not clear that Connecticut
recognizes a freestanding claim of actual innocence.63
• Another of the cases cited by Hamilton as recognizing a freestanding
claim of actual innocence, Illinois v. Washington,64 gave relief to the
defendant, but only where the evidence establishing innocence was newly
discovered: “We therefore hold as a matter of Illinois constitutional
jurisprudence that a claim of newly discovered evidence showing a
defendant to be actually innocent of the crime for which he was convicted
is cognizable as a matter of due process.”65 Thus, Washington does not
provide support for the proposition that Illinois supports an actual
innocence claim simpliciter, but only that it would recognize such a claim
based on newly discovered evidence that was not available to the
defendant at the time of the original trial.
• Montoya v. Ulibarri,66 a New Mexico Supreme Court decision,
recognized a claim of actual innocence, as did Amrine v. Roper,67 a
Missouri Supreme Court decision, and Montana v. Beach,68 a Montana
Supreme Court decision. Montoya expressly stated that the evidence
establishing actual innocence did not have to be newly discovered,69
while Amrine did not address the issue. Montoya is thus probably the outof-state case that most strongly supports Hamilton.

Notably, in most of these cases, the remedy contemplated by the courts if
the defendant prevailed was a new trial.70 Only Montana v. Beach found
that the defendant was entitled to be set free if he prevailed on his actual
innocence motion.71 Once again, Hamilton seems to have exceeded most of
the authority on which it relied.
Finally, Hamilton also fundamentally expands the interpretation of CPL
section 440.10(1)(h). That section had allowed for collateral relief when it
could be shown that a defendant’s constitutional rights at trial were
we need not decide here whether such a claim would lie, inasmuch as petitioner’s claim does
rely on newly discovered evidence . . . .” (first emphasis added)).
62. See Hamilton, 979 N.Y.S.2d at 106 & n.3 (citing Gould v. Comm’r of Corr., 22 A.3d
1196 (Conn. 2011); Miller v. Comm’r of Corr., 700 A.2d 1108 (Conn. 1997); Summerville
v. Warden, 641 A.2d 1356 (Conn. 1994)).
63. See id. at 106 (citing Gould, 22 A.3d at 1200 n.8).
64. 665 N.E.2d 1330 (Ill. 1996).
65. Id. at 1337.
66. 163 P.3d 476 (N.M. 2007).
67. 102 S.W.3d 541 (Mo. 2003).
68. 302 P.3d 47 (Mont. 2013).
69. See Montoya, 163 P.3d at 487.
70. See Gould v. Comm’r of Corr., 22 A.3d 1196 (Conn. 2011); see also Washington,
665 N.E.2d at 478; id. at 490 (McMorrow, J., concurring); Amrine, 102 S.W.3d at 549. In
Montoya v. Ulibarri and In re Bell, the New Mexico and California Supreme Courts,
respectively, found that the defendants had not met the burden of proof to establish actual
innocence, and so the courts did not reach the issue of determining the appropriate remedy.
See In re Bell, 170 P.3d 153, 157 n.2 (Cal. 2007); Montoya, 163 P.3d at 487–88.
71. Beach, 302 P.3d at 54 (stating that if a petitioner succeeds on a freestanding actual
innocence claim, then “the petitioner is forever exonerated”; the case went on to hold,
however, that the petitioner before the court had failed to prove his freestanding claim).
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violated.72 Hamilton provides that a conviction following a trial that is
absolutely without procedural or other error may nevertheless be
collaterally attacked (indeed, vacated and the indictment dismissed) upon a
showing of actual innocence because, according to Hamilton, the result of
the error-free trial is itself a due process violation.
B. What Evidence Will Be Admissible
at an “Actual Innocence” Hearing?
Hamilton held that at an “actual innocence” hearing the court should
consider “all reliable evidence, including evidence not admissible at trial
based upon a procedural bar.”73 To what “procedural bars” is the court
referring? Consider a statement by a non-testifying codefendant that tends
to exculpate the defendant, and that the defendant claims should be
admitted pursuant to the statement against penal interest exception to the
rule against hearsay. Suppose further that the original trial court ruled that
the statement was not a statement against penal interest. Is that ruling a
“procedural bar”? The same question applies for almost any testimony or
document that the defendant in the original trial unsuccessfully sought to
introduce into evidence: Was the trial court’s ruling—on grounds of
hearsay, inauthenticity, undue prejudice or irrelevance—a “procedural
bar”?
A related question is how the law-of-the-case doctrine would work in the
section 440 context. Suppose a trial judge in the original criminal trial
holds that a certain piece of evidence is inadmissible, and the defendant is
convicted. The defendant appeals the judgment of conviction, alleging,
among other things, that the exclusion of evidence was wrongful, but his
argument is rejected and his conviction affirmed. Then the criminal
defendant files a federal habeas petition, once again challenging, on federal
constitutional grounds, the exclusion of the proffered evidence. Once
again, his argument is rejected. Now, the defendant files an “actual
innocence” claim pursuant to CPL section 440.10(h) and seeks to present
the same piece of evidence before the section 440 court. Can the court
consider the evidence or is it bound by the earlier decisions that have held it
inadmissible?
The strong suggestion in Hamilton is that the rules of evidence do not
apply, and the notion underlying the suggestion is that a proceeding to
determine “actual innocence” is akin to an exercise of the court’s equitable
jurisdiction. It is not clear, however, why this should be so. After all, the
rules of evidence developed to ensure that only reliable evidence came
before a finder of fact, and there is no obvious reason that the rules should
not apply at a section 440 hearing.
It is important to recognize that the questions of admissibility of evidence
go both ways. For example, what of incriminating evidence that was
72. See supra notes 9–11 and accompanying text (discussing prior applications of CPL
section 440.10(1)(h)).
73. People v. Hamilton, 979 N.Y.S.2d 97, 109 (App. Div. 2014).
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suppressed before the underlying criminal trial not because it was unreliable
but for some other reason—for example, that a defendant was not read his
Miranda rights, or a search warrant was defective? Can the prosecution
rely on that evidence at an actual innocence hearing, even though it was not
entitled to rely on it at the underlying trial?
C. Should an Actual Innocence Claim Be Differently Analyzed
Depending on Whether the Underlying Conviction
Followed a Jury Trial or a Guilty Plea?
Should a court’s ruling on a section 440.10(h) “actual innocence” petition
depend in any way on whether the defendant was convicted pursuant to: (a)
a jury trial, (b) a bench trial, or (c) a guilty plea? On the one hand, one
might argue that how the defendant’s underlying conviction arose is
irrelevant to the merits of her petition—an underlying conviction is an
underlying conviction. On the other hand, one might consider that a jury
trial is the “gold standard” of criminal justice,74 and therefore a petition
following a jury verdict of guilty should be especially hard to upend.
Although this question has not been extensively litigated, it appears that
most courts have held that they will not entertain actual innocence claims
following guilty pleas.75 As one court explained:
A major theoretical support for permitting an actual-innocence challenge
is that the conviction of and incarceration of an innocent person offends
due process. But if that is so, where a defendant pleads guilty, any denial
of due process is the result of his or her own doing. It is difficult to
perceive how one who has voluntarily and knowingly pleaded guilty to a
crime has wrongly been denied due process.76

It remains to be seen, however, whether a guilty plea would prevent any
claim of innocence, or whether one who has pled guilty could still assert a
gateway claim of innocence. That is, might a defendant who has pled guilty

74. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1398 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
75. See, e.g., State v. Westover, No. 2 CA-CR 2011-0319-PR, 2012 WL 432633, at *3
(Ariz. Ct. App. Feb. 10, 2012); People v. Barnslater, 869 N.E.2d 293, 306 (Ill. App. Ct.
2007) (“[W]e would strongly question whether a claim for relief under the Post-Conviction
Hearing Act premised upon newly discovered evidence of actual innocence can suffice to
raise a cognizable constitutional deprivation where the challenged conviction was entered
pursuant to a plea of guilty.”); Norris v. State, 896 N.E.2d 1149, 1153 (Ind. 2008); Majors v.
State, 946 So.2d 369, 374 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006) (“Majors cannot now claim that he has
newly discovered evidence which would have ‘produced a different result’ because his guilty
plea essentially nullifies any argument that there is some undiscovered evidence which could
prove his innocence.”); People v. Cosey, No. 8131/97, slip op. at 25 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 20,
2013) (absent extraordinary circumstances, a defendant’s guilty plea acts as a bar to an
actual innocence hearing) (on file with the Fordham Law Review). Some courts have
allowed for petitions of actual innocence even following a guilty plea. See, e.g., Smith v.
State, No. 58973, 2012 WL 765092, at *2 (Nev. Mar. 8, 2012); Ex parte Brown, 205 S.W.3d
538 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (considering a claim of actual innocence following a guilty plea
but rejecting the claim on the merits).
76. Cosey, No. 8131/97, slip op. at 25.
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be permitted to show her innocence and, if she succeeds in doing so, then
attempt to show that her plea was somehow constitutionally defective?77
D. How Heavily Should the Court Weigh the Tardiness
of the Application Against the Defendant?
CPL section 440.10(1)(g) provides for the vacatur of a conviction where
newly discovered evidence compels such a result. The requirement that
evidence be newly discovered serves an important purpose: it prevents
defendants from holding back evidence, or not searching diligently for
evidence, in connection with their underlying criminal trial, and then
presenting new evidence before another judge, seeking to get a new trial
entirely—another bite at the apple.
Hamilton would appear to suggest that the evidence that the defendant
seeks to present pursuant to CPL section 440.10(1)(h) for her “actual
innocence” claim need not be newly discovered. But were that so, there
would be no limit to the defendant getting such a second (or third, or fourth)
bite at the apple. At the very least, if the tardiness of the evidentiary
showing is not a per se reason for rejecting the petition—as it would be
were the petition sought pursuant to CPL section 440.10(1)(g)—the court
should weigh the fact that a defendant’s evidence was not presented at the
original trial very heavily against the defendant, unless the defendant can
give a convincing reason that the evidence was not presented in a timely
fashion.
E. Why Is the Remedy Dismissal of the Indictment?
If the defendant prevails, Hamilton holds, then “the indictment should be
dismissed pursuant to CPL [section] 440.10(4), which authorizes that
disposition where appropriate.”78 It is important to recognize that the
dismissal of an indictment is an extraordinary remedy. The typical
remedy—expressly recognized by CPL section 440.10(4) and (5)—where
newly discovered evidence casts doubt on the integrity of the conviction is
to vacate the judgment of conviction and set the case for a new trial.79 By
vacating the conviction and allowing the case to be tried again, the court
respects the roles of the grand jury (to indict), the prosecution (to present
the case to a jury), and the jury (to determine, in light of all of the evidence
whether the government has met its burden to prove guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt).
The Hamilton court’s ruling that the remedy for an actual innocence
claim is dismissal of the indictment is especially notable because—CPL
section 440.10(6)—provides for dismissal of the indictment in a particular
circumstance: where the underlying conviction is for loitering for the
77. For example, the defendant suffered ineffective assistance of counsel, the
defendant’s plea was coerced and thus involuntary, or the defendant did not understand her
rights and thus the plea was not knowing.
78. People v. Hamilton, 979 N.Y.S.2d 97, 109 (App. Div. 2014).
79. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10(4)–(5) (McKinney 2005).
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purpose of engaging in prostitution or engaging in prostitution, and the
defendant is the victim of a sex-trafficking crime.80 That provision makes
perfect sense, because one who is a victim of sex trafficking should not be
criminally responsible for engaging in prostitution. The point, though, is
that the legislature carefully distinguished between instances (the vast
majority) in which a judgment must be vacated and the instance
(prostitution by a sex-trafficking victim), where not only must the judgment
be vacated, but the charging instrument must be dismissed as well. The
legislature did not provide for mandatory dismissal of the charging
instrument where the defendant’s petition asserted an actual innocence
claim under CPL section 440.10(1)(h).
What justification is there for the extraordinary remedy of dismissal of
the indictment? The only explanation can be that the evidence presented to
the court determining actual innocence is so overwhelming that it is clear
that no juror could find that the defendant was guilty of the crime charged
in the indictment, and that any prosecution would necessarily result in an
order of dismissal. And this makes sense: if the evidence were such that
the defendant could not be found guilty, then there is no reason to make him
sit through the ordeal of a trial. Dismissal of the indictment is the proper
remedy.
Almost. There are at least two problems with the explanation. The first
is a practical one: in many cases, it will be exceedingly difficult for the
court to be confident that a juror could not find that the defendant was
guilty. There will be some cases where this standard is met. DNA
exonerations come immediately to mind, but after those, there are very few.
If one were to take the standard seriously—and it must be taken seriously—
then any actual innocence motion that depends on an interested witness’s
credibility would have to be denied because it is virtually impossible to say
that every juror would believe the interested witness. Yet, that is the
standard that would have to be satisfied to dismiss the indictment.
Furthermore, once again the evidentiary standard on actual innocence
motions raises complications. What if the court considering the actual
innocence motion reaches its decision that the defendant has met his burden
by relying on evidence that would be inadmissible at a criminal trial (again,
think of the case of the codefendant’s confession that exonerates the
defendant)? The court cannot answer whether “any reasonable juror would
vote to convict the defendant in light of this evidence” when the evidence
that the court is considering could not be before the juror.
The ultimate point is not merely a matter of evidentiary sleight of hand,
but of the separation of power within the criminal justice system. The
actual innocence motion places the court in the place of the jury as the
ultimate arbiter of guilt or innocence, and that is an extraordinary place for
it to be. One must not overstate the point, for it is not unprecedented for the
court to determine innocence; that is precisely what a judgment of acquittal
following a verdict is. But such judgments following verdicts are rare.
80. See id. § 440.10(6).
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Courts must take care that actual innocence judgments that result in the
dismissal of indictments are rare, as well.
F. How Should the Court Weigh the Evidence
That Was Presented at the Underlying Trial?
According to Hamilton, a court hearing an actual innocence claim must
weigh the evidence of actual innocence against the weight of guilt.
Typically, that evidence will reside in the trial record (assume for the
moment that the underlying conviction was obtained pursuant to a trial, not
a plea). Therefore a court hearing an actual innocence claim will
presumably review the trial record, just as a court considering a newly
discovered evidence claim does under CPL section 440.10(1)(g).
This weighing of evidence presents unusual problems, however, because
it pits a live witness or witnesses (testifying on the defendant’s behalf)
against a cold, possibly very old, record. How is a judge to compare live
witnesses against witnesses whose demeanors she cannot see, whose tone
she cannot hear? It seems that the trial witnesses will be at a distinct
disadvantage. Indeed, it is not even clear how the court would go about
assessing the weight of the evidence adduced at trial. Would it consider the
number of eyewitnesses? Is the evidence stronger if there are three than if
there is one? Perhaps, but it would depend on the circumstances of their
viewing and the clarity of their testimony. Can the court consider how long
it took the jury to reach a verdict?81 Is a fast verdict a sign that the evidence
was strong, or that the jury was not diligent? Is a longer deliberation a sign
that the case was close, or that the jury was thorough? Drawing any
inferences from length of deliberation is probably unsound.
Furthermore, there is a lower limit below which the court cannot go in
assessing the evidence from the trial. The evidence could not have been too
weak, for it satisfied the proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard, which
was presumably tested not only in the trial court but in the appellate courts
as well. Once again, the point is that unless actual innocence hearings are
to be opportunities for the courts to usurp entirely the role of the juries,
findings of actual innocence must be the rare exception rather than the rule.
The problem of weighing the evidence is especially difficult when the
underlying conviction is by a guilty plea.82 The evidentiary record in such
a case consists solely of a plea allocution. As Justice Scalia asked in a
federal habeas case:
[H]ow is the court to determine “actual innocence” . . . where conviction
was based upon an admission of guilt? Presumably, the defendant will
introduce evidence (perhaps nothing more than his own testimony)
showing that he did not “use” a firearm in committing the crime to which
81. See, e.g., People v. Bryant, 986 N.Y.S.2d 287, 289 (App. Div. 2014) (in granting
motion based on actual innocence, court notes that the jury “deliberated for over 13 hours
and, at one point, was deadlocked” implying that the length of deliberation and the
deadlocking were the products of relatively weak evidence of guilt).
82. As noted above, many courts have refused to entertain claims of actual innocence
following guilty pleas. See supra notes 74–75 and accompanying text.
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he pleaded guilty, and the Government, eight years after the fact, will
have to find and produce witnesses saying that he did. This seems to me
not to remedy a miscarriage of justice, but to produce one.83

G. What Must a Defendant Show
to Be Entitled to an Evidentiary Hearing?
Hamilton presumes that the defendant will file a petition with some
evidence—typically in the form of affidavits—that, if truthful, would
establish his innocence. In Hamilton itself, for example, there were
affidavits from witnesses who had not testified at Hamilton’s trial, averring
to his alibi.84
Plainly, if the claims in those affidavits were accepted as true, then
Hamilton could not be guilty. The question is thus presented: When it is
trying to determine whether to hold a hearing on the defendant’s actual
innocence, must the trial court accept the affidavits as truthful? If the court
is required to accept the factual averments in the affidavits as truthful then it
would appear that the court would have no choice but to order a hearing.
The upshot will be that every case in which the defendant files a facially
plausible claim of actual innocence will result in a hearing. But that answer
would likely lead to chaos because virtually every conviction in which the
defendant receives a lengthy period of incarceration would result in
protracted actual innocence hearings long after the conviction. The
criminal justice system would grind to a halt.
So, how can a court decide whether a hearing is warranted? Witnesses
often recant their testimony, and the law is clear that such recantations are
given slight weight by the courts.85 How can a court decide—based on
affidavits only—whether a recantation is valid? New witnesses, even
biased ones, might be found to submit affidavits that support the
defendant’s innocence—the new witness may “recall,” for example, that he
was with the defendant at the time of the crime, or he overheard someone
else admitting to the crime and exonerating the defendant, many years later.
It is apparent that courts must apply some level of scrutiny to the affidavits
that defendants will submit in their efforts to obtain an actual innocence
hearing, but defining the level of scrutiny may prove to be a very difficult
task.
H. Whither the Procedural Bars?
Defendants are absolutely barred from asserting claims that they could
have made—or that they made and lost—on appeal.86 Hamilton held that
because the actual innocence claim was based on evidence that had not been
83. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 631 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
84. See People v. Hamilton, 979 N.Y.S.2d 97, 100–01 (App. Div. 2014).
85. See, e.g., People v. Smalls, 894 N.Y.S.2d 791, 793 (App. Div. 2010) (“It is well
established that recantation evidence is inherently unreliable . . . .” (internal quotation and
citations omitted)).
86. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10(2)(a), (c) (McKinney 2005); see also supra
note 13 and accompanying text.

16

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW RES GESTAE

[Vol. 83

presented at trial, the claim could not have been asserted on direct appeal,
and therefore these provisions did not apply.87 As to the discretionary bars
of CPL section 440.10(3), the appellate court found that “there is no reason
why the courts may not consider a credible claim of actual innocence in the
exercise of discretion.”88
But that leaves a question: Could a trial court, in the exercise of its
discretion, determine that the discretionary bars apply even to a claim of
actual innocence? In particular, one of the discretionary grounds on which
a court might stand to deny a claim is that it was raised on a previous
petition or could have been.89 Hamilton held that it was not an abuse of
discretion for a court to hear a claim of actual innocence notwithstanding
that the discretionary bars might apply. It left open the question, however,
whether it would be an abuse of the court’s discretion to refuse to hear such
a claim where the discretionary bar applied.
I. Is There a Sound Basis
for the “Clear and Convincing Evidence” Burden of Proof?
Following the federal case law, and the cases from other states, Hamilton
imposed the burden on the defendant to establish his actual innocence by
“clear and convincing” evidence.90 The problem with that holding is that it
contradicts express statutory language, for CPL section 440 is very clear:
section 440.30(6) provides that on any collateral attack “the defendant has
the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence every fact
essential to support the motion.”91
Hamilton notes CPL section 440.30(6) but summarily distinguished it,
stating that while that section applied a preponderance of the evidence
standard, “with respect to a claim of actual innocence, as distinguished from
a specific constitutional violation, a constitutional violation occurs only if
there is clear and convincing evidence that the defendant is innocent.”92 In
support, the court cited authority from other states or the opinions of trial
level courts in New York.93 The authority for the proposition is therefore
still unclear.
CONCLUSION
Actual innocence is hard to resist. It is impossible not to feel outraged on
behalf of those who are shown, indisputably, to have been wrongly
convicted. DNA exonerations are blessings to justice.
And yet there must be finality to our system of criminal justice.
Convictions must be final sometime. To allow extensive relitigation would
87.
text.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

See Hamilton, 979 N.Y.S.2d at 103–04; see also supra note 29 and accompanying
Hamilton, 979 N.Y.S.2d at 104.
See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10(3)(b)–(c).
See Hamilton, 979 N.Y.S.2d at 105, 109.
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.30(6).
Hamilton, 979 N.Y.S.2d at 108.
Id. (citing cases).
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permit meritless claims to prevail, gaining strength as the passage of time
erodes the truth, as witnesses die or their memories fade, as documents and
evidence are lost or degraded. To allow such relitigation would also
demean the guilty pleas and trials on which we all depend to resolve
criminal cases.
Hamilton was doubtless well motivated—by the desire that an innocent
man not be convicted of a crime. But closer examination of the broad
generalities reveals the complications:
that in most cases (DNA
exonerations being an exception), we do not know with certainty what
happened at the scene of the crime; that we can usually only draw
inferences based on the evidence; that drawing such inferences is exactly
what we ask juries to do; that unless evidence of innocence is newly
discovered and could not reasonably have been discovered at the time of the
defendant’s trial, then a court’s consideration of such evidence will
inevitably undermine the validity of the jury’s verdict—and ultimately, of
the jury system itself. What is the point of a jury trial if a judge can look at
evidence that could have been made available to the jury and make her own
decision, contrary to what the jury decided?
Not only does Hamilton upset the balance between judges and juries, and
deeply affect questions of finality, but it also challenges standard
understandings of the separation of powers between the legislature and the
courts. New York’s collateral review statute is very detailed.94 It does not
have an actual innocence provision. That is not an oversight: as Hamilton
notes, there was legislation pending in New York State at the time of the
decision that would have specifically provided for actual innocence
collateral attacks on judgments of conviction.95 That proposed legislation
would have provided for certain terms that Hamilton itself imposed (proof
by clear and convincing evidence, and the remedy of outright dismissal of
the accusatory instrument, rather than vacatur and remand for a new trial).96
But the law was not enacted. Hamilton thus did judicially what the state did
not do legislatively.
Whether Hamilton becomes a runaway train or a narrow exception to the
finality of jury verdicts depends, in part, on the answers to the questions
posed above, and doubtless others.

94. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10–.70.
95. See Hamilton, 979 N.Y.S.2d at 107 n.4; see also S.B. 49A, 2013 Sen., Reg. Sess.
(N.Y. 2013), available at http://open.nysenate.gov/legislation/bill/S49A-2013.
96. See S.B. 49A.

